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REVIEW 
 
Tina (A.C.) Besley and Michael A. Peters, Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education, 
and the Culture of Self (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), ISBN: 978-0820481951 
 
The long impact of Michel Foucault’s scholarship is well documented in fields as diverse as 
Geography, Philosophy, and Political Theory.  Other fields, however, are still coming to 
grips with the entirety of Foucault’s works, including the field of education.  This is not to 
say that Foucault has not inspired researchers in and of education – several important 
anthologies especially come to mind1 – rather, it is to say that the genre is still rapidly 
maturing.  Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education, and the Culture of Self by Tina (A.C.) 
Besley and Michael A. Peters marks a significant turning point in that maturation process. 
 
The authors have been writing about Foucault for quite some time and are two of the most 
respected Foucault scholars in educational studies.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that they 
would author the ‚first systematic exploration of the relevance of Foucault’s explorations of 
subjectivity and truth, and its significance for educational theory of what Foucault referred 
to on a number of occasions as ‘the culture of self,’ especially in a course of lectures he gave 
in Berkeley in the early 1980s.‛2  Much of the book is drawn from conference presentations 
and course offerings by the authors, with significant revisions in order to make them cohere 
as a whole.3  
 
Besley and Peters mobilize Foucault’s later work, especially his lectures, to frankly discuss 
the neoliberal shift in society and its implications for education.  This is a crucial and 
welcome move, as discussions of neoliberalism in education are almost the exclusive 
playground of Marxist-inspired educational researchers such as Peter McLaren, Henry 
Giroux, and Michael Apple.  Besley and Peters provide a rationale for looking at 
                                                 
1  Bernadette M. Baker and Katharina E. Heyning, Dangerous Coagulations?: The Uses of Foucault in 
the Study of Education (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004); Thomas S. Popkewitz and Marie 
Brennan, Foucault’s Challenge: Discourse, Knowledge, and Power in Education (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1997). 
2  Tina (A.C.) Besley and Michael A. Peters, Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education, and the 
Culture of Self (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), 5. Abbreviated throughout as ST. 
3  Besley & Peters, ST, xi.  
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neoliberalism from a non-Marxian point of view in a lengthy paragraph that deserves a 
significant excerpt here: 
 
First, a neo-Foucauldian approach to the sociology of governance avoids interpreting 
liberalism as an ideology, political philosophy, or an economic theory and reconfigures it 
as a form of governmentality with an emphasis on the question of how power is 
exercised.  Second, such an approach makes central the notion of the self-limiting state 
which, in contrast to the administrative (or police) state, brings together in productive 
ways questions of ethics and technique…  Third, it proposes an investigation of 
neoliberalism as an intensification of an economy of moral regulation first developed by 
liberals…  Fourth, the approach enables an understanding of the distinctive features of 
neoliberalism…  And, further, it understands neoliberalism through the development of 
a new relation between expertise and politics…4 
 
This lengthy section clearly differentiates Besley and Peters’ project from much other 
writing on the topic of neoliberalism.  It also provides the particular grounds on which this 
book stands. 
 
The taking up of neoliberalism follows from Foucault’s discussion of the topic in his 
Collège de France lecture series of 1978-1979, and recently translated into English as The 
Birth of Biopolitics.5  The final two chapters of Subjectivity and Truth address the new 
paradigm of neoliberalism exclusively; however, the first three quarters of the book are 
spent laying the groundwork for this later discussion. 
 
The book begins by discussing the subject in the tradition of philosophy.  As Besley and 
Peters note, ‚Ever since the first moment of institutional philosophy the notion of the self 
has presented itself as an object of inquiry, as a problem, and as a locus for posing questions 
concerning knowledge, action and ethics.‛6  This statement acts as a foil in order to situate 
Foucault’s shift from the study ‚of sexual behavior and pleasures in antiquity based on 
aphrodisia to extract from it and study the more general problem of ‘the subject and truth’.‛7 
Periodizing Foucault’s work is helpful in many ways, and Besley and Peters are perhaps 
correct to begin by analyzing the disjunctures in Foucault’s oeuvre. However, dividing 
Foucault’s work into early, middle, and later periods8 is problematic in that it gives the 
impression that there were separate projects being undertaken, which can lead to the false 
understanding that, for example, the ‚early‛ and ‚late‛ Foucault were at odds with one 
                                                 
4  Besley & Peters, ST, 132-133. 
5  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, translated by 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
6  Besley & Peters, ST, 3. 
7  Ibid., 4. 
8  As do, for example, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond 
Power and Knowledge (New York: Other Press, 2006). 
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another or that he revised his earlier work on power to re-inject a liberal subject.9 
Nonetheless, it is a necessary place to begin. 
 The remainder of ‚Chapter One: The Culture of Self‛ is dedicated to laying the 
groundwork for the rest of the book.  Besley and Peters draw attention to Foucault’s 
discussion of technologies of the self, a brief discussion of Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of 
Narcissism, an analysis of the notion of care of the self, and, finally, the practices of reading 
and writing the self.  The latter section is particularly important for educationalists, 
because, as the authors note, ‚It is especially this last notion *learning how to read+ that is 
worth pondering in relation to pedagogy.‛10  Finally, they close the chapter with the 
following observation: 
 
Almost certainly we are witnessing a shift from the shaping of an individual of classical 
liberalism – the ethical individual of Kantian humanism – to a market individualism of 
neoliberalism where the self is shaped as a utility maximizer, a free and contractual 
individual, who is self-constituted through the market choices and investment decisions 
that he/she makes.11 
 
This statement has clear implications for the remainder of the book. 
 
Chapter 2 is entitled ‚The Genealogy of the Confessional Self: Self-Denial or Self-Mastery?‛ 
and traces Foucault’s conception of the self from the death of man through the confessional 
technologies of Christianity and ‚medico-therapeutic confessional practices.‛12  Most 
notable here are the concluding thoughts of Besley and Peters, when they, along with 
Foucault, reject the Christian ethic of self-denial and instead ‚suggest that confession as a 
technology of self should be based less on an ethic of self-denial than one of self-mastery.‛13 
This is clearly a moment in which Besley and Peters illustrate the project of Foucault’s later 
writing, especially his work on the technologies of the self.  They also illustrate that 
Foucault’s discussions of power and discourse are integral to the care of the self: 
 
Foucault (1997a) contrasts two different models of self-interpretation: liberation and 
freedom, suggesting that the latter is broader than the former and historically necessary 
once a country or people have attained a degree of independence and set up a political 
                                                 
9  This point is especially poignant when the authors state on page 89, ‚In his early work Foucault,  
[sic] treated truth as a product of the regimentation of statements within discourses that had 
progressed or were in the process of progressing to the stage of a scientific discipline. In this 
conception, the subject, historicized in relation to social practices, is denied its freedom or 
effective agency.  This early conception of Foucault’s is to be contrasted with his later notion of 
the subject where freedom is seen to be an essential aspect of its constitution as in the concept of 
governmentality and in his studies of the history of sexuality.‛ 
10  Besley & Peters, ST, 14. 
11  Ibid., 18 
12  Ibid., 36. 
13  Ibid., 39. 
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society.  For Foucault, liberation is not enough and the practices of freedom do not 
preclude liberation, but they enable individuals and society to define ‘admissible and 
acceptable forms of existence or political society’ (Foucault, 1997a, p. 283).14 
 
One must be free of chains in order to enter the realm of the political, but that political 
existence is tied to dominant discourses and regimes of truth. 
 
By this point in the book, areas for clarification have become apparent. First is the 
somewhat productive, possibly distracting, tension between education, by which I think the 
authors mean schooling, and counseling and counseling education.  I understand that 
counselors play significant roles in schools and in the lives of the young people with whom 
they work, but I wonder about the seeming conflation.  At the least this tension deserves a 
more straightforward account.  What do chapters that foreground counseling do for readers 
who are expecting to find a book on education?  Is it because counseling happens within the 
school building?  Or is it because counseling is particularly complicit in the production of 
neoliberal subjects skilled at negotiating risk and the actuarial self described by Besley and 
Peters in the later chapters which focus more squarely on schools and school policy?  I am 
confident that the inclusion was intentional and calculated, but a more direct discussion 
would have been welcome.  
 
A second troubling indistinction is the attempt to discuss education in the context of not 
just one or two major English-speaking countries, such as the United States and/or the 
United Kingdom, but also in Australia and New Zealand.  Each of these countries has a 
robust educational research community and complex national and regional issues that 
greatly complicate their inclusion in a pan-Anglo discussion of schooling.  Clearly there are 
global currents at work that need to be identified and engaged, but this area too could have 
used greater explication and sustained attention by the authors.  However, neither area 
seriously detracts from the major arguments presented or from the valuable contribution 
the authors make to educational research. 
 
Much of the middle portion of the book is useful and deserves thoughtful engagement, but 
for the purposes of this review I will move on to chapters 7 and 8, entitled ‚Understanding 
the Neoliberal Paradigm of Education Policy‛ and, ‚Enterprise Culture and the Rise of the 
Entrepreneurial Self.‛  Together, these chapters signal a new direction that I hope will be 
taken up by educational researchers in much more detail in the future.  Where Besley and 
Peters survey the grounds of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand in this book, it will be up to other researchers to address the specific ways in which 
neoliberalism interacts with individual subjects on a local level. 
  
                                                 
14  Ibid., 23 (citations in the original). 
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Chapter 7 traces the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism through what Foucault referred 
to as biopolitics. They note: 
 
He [Foucault] focused on government as a set of practices legitimated by specific 
rationalities and saw that these three schools [German ordoliberalism, the Austrian 
school, and the Chicago school] of contemporary economic liberalism focused on the 
question of too much government – a permanent critique of the state that Foucault 
considers as a set of techniques for governing the self through the market.15 
 
 Later, they write; 
  
This approach centers on Foucault’s concept of governmentality as a means of mapping 
the ‘history of the present’ and understands the rationality of government as both permitting 
and requiring the practice of freedom of its subjects.  In other words, government in this sense 
only becomes possible at the point at which policing and administration stops; at the 
point at which the relations between government and self-government coincide and 
coalesce.16 
 
Essentially, Besley and Peters are pointing to the zone of indistinction between government 
and self-government where neoliberalism seems to have space to operate on and through 
subjects. 
 
Besley and Peters highlight, in chapter 7, the rise of human capital theory under Theodore 
Schultz, Gary Becker, and the (second) Chicago School of Economics.  The contemporary 
investment in human capital theory is a strong indicator of the path illuminated by 
Foucault in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures.  In a generation, by Schultz’s own admission, 
human capital went from being ‚inconceivable‛ in public discourse to being a focus of both 
Clinton and Bush in the 1992 presidential campaign.17  More and more since the 1970s, 
governments are crafting education policy based on the assumptions put forth by Becker, 
essentially willing human capital theory into reality. 
 
The one area in the book that could have been more developed is how the subject is 
produced at the moment that neoliberal education policy interacts with human bodies.  
This is unsurprising, though, as Foucault never truly addressed the issue either; indeed, 
Judith Butler provides a much more sophisticated account of subjectivation,18 which may 
highlight some of the limits to which we can take Foucault’s work (even his newly released 
                                                 
15  Ibid., 131-132 (emphasis in the original). 
16  Ibid., 132 (emphasis mine). 
17  Ibid., 154. 
18  See Judith Butler, Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, CA: Stanford University  
Press, 1997); Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). See also 
Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2003). 
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later lectures).  As it is, Besley and Peters mention the mutual reinforcement of what they 
term ‚modes of responsibilization‛ (i.e., student loan debt) and the subject’s application of 
‚certain management, economic, and actuarial techniques to themselves as subjects of a 
newly privatized welfare regime,‛19 but they do not adequately describe how and why the 
subject would actually do so.  This could have been addressed through a more intentional 
linking of Foucault’s later work on the care of the self to his earlier discussions of 
disciplinary and sovereign power.  
 
All told, Besley and Peters make a strong contribution to research on Foucault and 
education.  There are a few areas where their analysis could have been more specific  (i.e., 
by focusing more on localized techniques of neoliberalism), but overall they provide a 
strong reading of Foucault’s later work in a field Foucault himself only addressed 
tangentially and on occasion.  It is worth reading and extending in future work. 
 
 
 joshua j. kurz, The Ohio State University 
 
                                                 
19  Besley & Peters, ST, 164. 
